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ABSTRACT 
Since Moore v. Regents of the University of California, there has been a 
wide-ranging debate regarding the holding of the case and its implications for 
property law. Moore stands for the notion that individuals do not have a property 
interest in ordinary cells taken from their bodies during medical procedures nor 
the commercial products that researchers might develop from them. At the same 
time, cases such as Davis v. Davis and Hecht v. Superior Court have asserted 
that individuals maintain a property interest in other types of cells—namely 
embryos and gametes (eggs and sperm)—once they are removed from the body. 
This, among other developments, has led to a fragmented regime in property law 
pertaining to excised biological materials that turns, in large part, on the type of 
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cell in question: individuals have a diminished interest in regular somatic cells 
(skin, muscle, etc.) while courts have recognized that people retain a heightened 
property interest in reproductive cells such as sperm, eggs, and embryos. The 
articulated reason for the differential property interests in these two cell types is 
that embryos and gametes have the “potential for human life” while individuals 
are thought to have little use for ordinary body cells once they are excised.  
This default rule has framed property law regarding excised human cells for 
over two decades. It exists to balance the need for scientists to have access to 
research materials with individuals’ reproductive autonomy. To the extent that 
the dividing line determining the property interest in excised cells turns largely 
upon their “potential for human life,” the recent development of induced 
pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs) suggests that this default rule is becoming 
increasingly untenable. Research has shown that iPSCs can create the ability to 
genetically reprogram somatic cells into a pluripotent state that may allow them 
to differentiate into other types of cells—including eggs and sperm—that can be 
used to create new organisms. While these developments have not yet been fully 
applied to human iPSCs, they nonetheless suggest that iPSCs may soon be able to 
give ordinary somatic body cells the same potential for human life as naturally 
produced embryos and gametes but without the corresponding property interest. 
This Article argues that given this new technology, its relative success in 
animal models, and its impending application to human cells, the current default 
rules precluding individuals’ property interest in excised somatic cells needs 
substantial reconsideration. We propose a three-part approach to manage the 
challenges that iPSCs create for this aspect of property law. This includes (1) a 
self-imposed moratorium on human applications of iPSC research that can lead 
to human reproduction (2) Congressional action that vests property interests in 
the donors of somatic cells once their cells have been reprogrammed to a 
pluripotent state and differentiated into reproductive cells and (3) Judicial action 
that distinguishes Moore and related cases by acknowledging the reversion of 
property interest to donors once somatic materials are reprogrammed to a state 
of pluripotency and differentiated into reproductive cells. This proposal offers the 
best way to deal with the profound legal issues created by this new technology 
with the least disruption to existing rules and policy preferences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Like Marbury v. Madison and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California is one of a handful of cases that 
virtually every first-year law student reads as part of her introduction to the 
American legal system. Moore stands for what has become a proverbial default 
rule in property law: individuals do not have property interests in their own 
cells once they are removed from their bodies. (This default rule pertains to 
cells removed from living human beings during medical procedures, not (a) 
organs removed for transplant, (b) tissues subject to routine-removal statutes 
such as corneas from cadavers,1 or (c) anatomical gifts. These transactions are 
governed by the National Organ Transplant Act, state level implementations of 
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and other laws.) Thus, in Moore, researchers 
at UCLA Medical Center that used John Moore’s spleen cells without his 
knowledge or consent to develop a profitable cell line were not liable for 
conversion2 since the Court found that Moore no longer had a property interest 
in these excised cells. Yet, Moore’s holding regarding individuals’ diminished 
property interests in excised cells does not apply to all human cells. There are 
two exceptions: gametes (eggs and sperm) and embryos. Courts have found that 
since these cells have the potential to create or become independent human 
beings, individuals retain a property interest in them after being removed from 
the body that does not exist for somatic cells, or the ordinary non-reproductive 
cells that make up various parts of the body such as hair, skin, or Moore’s 
spleen. Thus, the critical dividing line in property law with regards to 
individuals’ interest in their excised cells is whether or not they have the 
“potential for human life.”3 
To the extent that the default rule regarding individuals’ diminished 
property interest in excised human cells largely exists for policy reasons such 
as promoting efficient research and respecting individuals’ reproductive 
decision-making,4 this dividing line between gametes and embryos on one hand 
and ordinary non-reproductive somatic cells on the other appears coherent. 
Excised somatic cells that do not have any reproductive capacity are important 
 
 1.  See COMMITTEE ON INCREASING RATES OF ORGAN DONATION, ORGAN DONATION: 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION 206-07 (JAMES F. CHILDRESS & CATHARYN T. LIVERMAN eds., 
2006). 
 2.  Conversion is a tort that reflects the “unauthorized and wrongful exercise of 
dominion and control over another’s personal property, to the exclusion of or inconsistent 
with rights of owner.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed. 1990). 
 3.  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992). 
 4.  Individuals’ intent and institutional informed consent play a significant role in the 
disposition of these cells. See discussion in Part II. 
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for scientific advancement and often have little value to most patients. 
Therefore, a default rule that gives sole property interests to scientists and 
research entities to the exclusion of individual patients encourages efficiency 
that promotes and rewards innovation. In contrast, gametes and embryos that 
have the potential to create independent human life may be extraordinarily 
valuable to individuals, which law recognizes by acknowledging a continued 
property interest in these types of cells once outside of the body. 
However, new developments in human biotechnology are making this 
dividing line increasingly untenable—to the point where current default rules 
espousing individuals’ diminished property interest in somatic cells may need 
substantial reconsideration. In 2007, research groups headed by Shinya 
Yamanaka5 and Jamie Thompson6 demonstrated the ability to reprogram 
human somatic cells into a pluripotent state. This means that regular somatic 
cells like those from Moore’s spleen—the very types of cells that individuals 
have a diminished property interest in once excised—can be reverted back into 
a condition (pluripotency) whereby they can develop into several different 
types of cells—including eggs or sperm.7 Known as induced pluripotent stem 
cells (iPSCs), these cells are hailed as offering an end-run around the ethical 
quagmire surrounding embryonic stem cells since they offer the promise of 
regenerative medicine (where such pluripotency might allow researchers to 
“grow” patient-specific cells to cure diseases) without the ethically fraught 
issue of destroying embryos. 
Yet at the same time that iPSC research has been heralded as resolving a 
particularly thorny ethical issue, it has created a profound challenge for 
property law that has gone almost wholly unnoticed. If the legal justification 
for diminishing individuals’ property interests in their own somatic cells and 
acknowledging scientists’ claims to own such material is that these cells do not 
have the “potential for human life,” then the impending ability to reprogram 
such cells into a pluripotent state where they can then differentiate into 
reproductive cells with the potential to become autonomous human beings 
radically upends this logic. In short, human iPSCs, if they achieve the same 
potential as has already been demonstrated in animal experiments, can become 
a profound game changer in that every somatic cell would have the “potential 
for human life”; the proverbial spleen cells from John Moore and any other 
ordinary cells removed during medical procedures would potentially be just a 
few steps away from being turned into gametes that could then be used for 
reproductive purposes. This suggests that this new technology might blur the 
 
 5.  Kazutoshi Takahashi et al., Induction of Pluripotent Stem Cells from Adult Human 
Fibroblasts by Defined Factors, 131 CELL 861, 861 (2007). 
 6.  Junying Yu et al., Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Lines Derived from Human 
Somatic Cells, 318 SCIENCE 1917, 1917 (2007). 
 7.  While iPSC research with mice has shown the ability to induce somatic cells into a 
pluripotent state that can then differentiate into reproductive cells, this research has not yet 
been done with humans though it is considered to be feasible. See Part III. 
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dividing lines and default rules in property law and that serious reconsideration 
may be needed. 
Despite the wide-ranging post-Moore discussion of property rights in 
excised human cells, this Article is the first to identify and articulate the 
profound challenges raised by iPSCs for property law. These challenges are 
likely to have important implications. Given an estimated 270 million human 
tissue samples held in domestic biobanks, the development of iPSCs adds a 
new and qualitatively different dimension to an endearing question in property 
law: who can own your body (in terms of excised cells and tissues) and under 
what circumstances? 
This Article proceeds in three parts to address these issues. Part I assesses 
existing rules pertaining to individuals’ property interests in excised somatic 
cells as well as gametes and embryos. Part I also examines key cases in the 
development of this jurisprudence to identify and substantiate a basic 
underlying premise in property law pertaining to excised human cells: in the 
absence of a contract or preexisting agreement, default property interest in 
excised human cells is given to researchers and scientists except in the case of 
eggs, sperm, and embryos, whereby individuals retain a property interest since 
these cells have the “potential for human life.” Thus, Part I highlights how this 
potentiality is a key dividing line in establishing differential property interests 
in excised human cells. Part II discusses the development of iPSCs and how 
this technology might complicate the logic of this dividing line by giving 
human somatic cells the potential to become life through cellular 
reprogramming that reverts them to a pluripotent state where they can 
differentiate into many types of cells, potentially including eggs and sperm. 
Part III situates this issue in the landscape of the current scholarly debate on 
property interest in human cells to highlight the transformative nature of this 
technology; existing conversations have entirely missed the significance of 
iPSC research for property law. We then offer a three-part proposal for how 
law and science should respond to the challenges raised by iPSCs. We argue 
that (1) the scientific community should engage in a self-imposed moratorium 
on human applications of iPSC research that may lead to human reproduction; 
(2) that Congress should enact legislation that vests property interests in 
excised somatic cells in donors once these cells have been reprogrammed to a 
pluripotent state and differentiated into reproductive cells; and (3) that courts 
should acknowledge the heightened property interest that vests in excised 
somatic cells once they are reprogrammed to a pluripotent state and 
differentiated into reproductive cells. After discussing various objections some 
may have with this proposal and offering rebuttals, we conclude with a brief 
discussion of this Article’s significance for the future of property law. 
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I. PROPERTY LAW REGARDING SOMATIC CELLS, GAMETES, AND EMBRYOS: A 
BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Since Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the law regarding 
individuals’ property interests in excised cells has been fragmented and 
unevenly developed. Starting with Moore, this section discusses key cases that 
have laid the broad foundations for the current default rules that confer 
differential property interests to human cells in a manner that depends heavily 
on their potential to create or become human life. Although the case law on this 
topic is scarce and dispersed, courts have consistently concluded that 
individuals have little to no property interests in excised somatic cells while 
also acknowledging individuals’ significant property interests in gametes and 
embryos that exist outside the body. The potential to create or become full 
human beings plays a large role in the court’s justification for these rules. 
A. Somatic Cells 
Discussions about property rights and the human body are not new.8 
However, recent developments in new reproductive and genetic technologies 
have given rise to novel questions about the rights individuals have in excised 
tissues and cells. Moore v. Regents of the University of California represents 
one of the earliest judicial considerations of this question, and its disposition 
has had cascading effects on how the law understands individuals’ property 
interests in their own cells once they are disconnected from their bodies. 
John Moore was a patient at UCLA Medical Center in the mid 1970’s, 
where he received treatment for hairy-cell leukemia. In the course of this 
treatment, Dr. David Golde, Moore’s physician, took “extensive amounts of 
blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances” all while knowing—
 
 8.  See generally ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW (1997). Radhika Rao offers an 
interesting discussion of an early theory of the body as property as articulated by John 
Locke: “The image of the body as a form of property possessed by its ‘owner’ dates back at 
least to John Locke, whose influential theory of property derived all ownership from the 
property possessed by individuals in their own persons. In his treatise “Of Property,” written 
around 1690, Locke asserted: “Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all 
Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but 
himself.” According to Locke, individual ownership of the physical body entailed ownership 
of those external things that are the product of the body’s labor. Yet Locke apparently 
envisioned the body as property of a special sort, held in trust rather than as an individual 
owner. As a result, he believed that a person’s rights to life and liberty were inalienable 
because they were not his own, but belonged to another. These limits upon bodily property 
followed from the fact that ultimate ownership rested with the deity. Thus Locke apparently 
viewed individuals as stewards over their bodies, possessing themselves in trust rather than 
as outright owners. Therefore, despite his reliance upon property rhetoric, his image of the 
rights individuals possess in their bodies clearly does not rise to the level of complete 
ownership.” Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 
367-68 (2000). 
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and without disclosing to Moore—that these biological materials “were of great 
value in a number of commercial and scientific efforts,” that could provide 
“competitive, commercial, and scientific advantages.”9 Moore also had his 
spleen removed at Golde’s recommendation. While Golde received consent for 
the splenectomy, he did not disclose to Moore that his spleen and other 
biological materials would be used for research. Between 1976 and 1983, 
Moore travelled to UCLA Medical Center from his home in Seattle to give 
more samples of blood and other tissues because “he had been told that the 
procedures were to be performed only there and only under Golde’s 
direction.”10 
Little did Moore know that Golde was working with others to develop a 
cell line from T-lymphocytes derived from Moore’s tissues. Golde, Shirley 
Quan, and the Regents of the University of California patented the cell line and 
shared in the royalties while excluding Moore from any compensation.11 
Moore brought suit, claiming a breach of fiduciary duty and lack of informed 
consent. Moore also brought a claim for conversion, or that the defendants 
interfered with his interest in his personal property—his blood, cells, etc.—and 
that he subsequently had an interest in the products derived from his bodily 
materials.12 While the Court found that Dr. Golde did not fulfill his fiduciary 
duty to Moore and impermissibly failed to obtain informed consent by not 
disclosing his financial interests, it ruled against Moore’s conversion claims. As 
a descriptive matter, the Court stated that current law simply did not support 
Moore’s claim that he owned these excised biological materials, which is a 
predicate to making any successful claim that they were illegally subject to 
conversion.13 The Court refused to extend the principle of conversion to this 
 
 9.  Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990). 
 10.  Id. at 482. 
 11.  “With the Regents’ assistance, Golde negotiated agreements for commercial 
development of the cell line and products to be derived from it. Under an agreement with 
Genetics Institute, Golde ‘became a paid consultant’ and ‘acquired the rights to 75,000 
shares of common stock.’ Genetics Institute also agreed to pay Golde and the Regents ‘at 
least $ 330,000 over three years, including a pro-rata share of [Golde’s] salary and fringe 
benefits, in exchange for . . . exclusive access to the materials and research performed’ on 
the cell line and products derived from it. On June 4, 1982, Sandoz ‘was added to the 
agreement,’ and compensation payable to Golde and the Regents was increased by $ 
110,000. ‘[T]hroughout this period, . . . Quan spent as much as 70 [percent] of her time 
working for [the] Regents on research’ related to the cell line.” Id. at 482. 
 12.  “Moore also attempts to characterize the invasion of his rights as a conversion – a 
tort that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in personal 
property. He theorizes that he continued to own his cells following their removal from his 
body, at least for the purpose of directing their use, and that he never consented to their use 
in potentially lucrative medical research. Thus, to complete Moore’s argument, defendants’ 
unauthorized use of his cells constitutes a conversion. As a result of the alleged conversion, 
Moore claims a proprietary interest in each of the products that any of the defendants might 
ever create from his cells or the patented cell line.” Id. at 487. 
 13.  Quoting Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co, the Moore Court noted 
that “to establish a conversion, plaintiff must establish an actual interference with his 
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novel area of excised cells for three reasons. First, the Court noted that this 
analogy—treating excised biological materials like personal property—had not 
been supported by any other court, suggesting a general consensus that 
individuals did not retain an ownership interest in cells akin to personal 
property once removed from the body. Second, state statutes limited what 
individuals could do with excised biological materials, which suggested that 
any ownership interest in them has been significantly curtailed.14 Lastly, with 
regard to Moore’s claim that he had a property interest in the cell line derived 
from him, the Court reasoned that “[it] cannot be Moore’s property . . . . 
because the patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the 
cells taken from Moore’s body.”15 
But the Court also made a series of normative claims regarding whether a 
property interest in excised cells ought to be recognized to support Moore’s 
conversion claims, which allowed the Court to discuss various policy issues 
implicated by this situation in a manner that has substantially affected this area 
of law. The Court cited three policy reasons to explain why the use of excised 
cells in medical research did not constitute conversion. First, the Court 
explained that these issues are better handled by legislatures. Second, the Court 
acknowledged that a tort of conversion is not necessary to affirm or protect the 
rights of patients. But the Court seemed most disturbed by the third reason: that 
potentially adverse impacts might follow from extending the tort of conversion 
into the area of biomedical specimens. The Court noted: 
Research on human cells plays a critical role in medical research. This is so 
because researchers are increasingly able to isolate naturally occurring, 
medically useful biological substances and to produce useful quantities of 
such substances through genetic engineering. These efforts are beginning to 
bear fruit. Products developed through biotechnology that have already been 
approved for marketing in this country include treatments and tests for 
leukemia, cancer, diabetes, dwarfism, hepatitis-B, kidney transplant rejection, 
emphysema, osteoporosis, ulcers, anemia, infertility, and gynecological 
 
ownership or right of possession . . . Where plaintiff neither has title to the property alleged 
to have been converted, nor possession thereof, he cannot maintain an action for 
conversion.” Id. at 488. 
 14.  “Pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 7054.4, ‘[n]otwithstanding any other 
provision of law, recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, 
or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment, 
incineration, or any other method determined by the state department [of health services] to 
protect the public health and safety.’ Clearly the Legislature did not specifically intend this 
statute to resolve the question of whether a patient is entitled to compensation for the 
nonconsensual use of excised cells. A primary object of the statute is to ensure the safe 
handling of potentially hazardous biological waste materials. Yet one cannot escape the 
conclusion that the statute’s practical effect is to limit, drastically, a patient’s control over 
excised cells. By restricting how excised cells may be used and requiring their eventual 
destruction, the statute eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that 
one cannot simply assume that what is left amounts to “property” or “ownership” for 
purposes of conversion law.” Id. at 491-92. 
 15.  Id. at 492. 
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tumors, to name but a few . . . . [T]he extension of conversion law into this 
area will hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw 
materials. . . . [The] exchange of scientific materials, which still is relatively 
free and efficient, will surely be compromised if each cell sample becomes the 
potential subject matter of a lawsuit.
16
 
Thus, the burden that might befall the scientific community drives much of the 
Court’s concern. For the Moore court, the legislature should lead such far-
reaching changes rather than the judiciary since they involve policy issues far 
beyond individual property rights. The end result is that after Moore, 
individuals are thought to have radically diminished property interests in their 
excised somatic cells, although physicians and researchers still have a duty to 
inform patients that their biological materials may be used in research and for 
commercial purposes. 
Subsequent cases have further discussed and reaffirmed the Moore court’s 
conclusion that individuals do not have a property interest in excised cells. 
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, a 2003 decision by 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, involved 
the disposition of human tissues given to researchers for the purpose of 
identifying the genes responsible for Canavan diseases and developing carrier 
tests that would permit prenatal screening. This collaboration, where affected 
patients gave tissues and other biological materials to researchers, led to a 
breakthrough that identified the Canavan-associated gene. While the plaintiffs 
expected that any developments stemming from research using their blood and 
tissues would be offered in an affordable and accessible manner that stayed in 
the public domain, the researchers patented the gene. This gave the researchers 
and the hospital “the ability to restrict any activity related to the Canavan 
disease gene, including without limitation: carrier and prenatal testing, gene 
therapy, and other treatments . . . .”17 Soon after, the hospital allegedly 
threatened other hospitals that infringed their patent through unauthorized 
testing and began negotiating licenses and royalty fees that restricted the tests’ 
availability. The tissue donors sued, saying that they were not aware of the 
researchers’ intent to patent the research or commercialize it. 
The plaintiffs made several claims in their suit, including lack of informed 
consent, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent concealment. The plaintiffs’ 
conversion allegation claimed a property interest in research stemming from 
their donated tissues and blood. This was based on an underlying claim that 
they continued to possess a property interest in these biological materials once 
excised from their bodies. The court declined to extend conversion theory to 
excised tissues, stating that the tissues were “donations to research without any 
contemporaneous expectations of return of the body tissue and genetic 
 
 16.  Id. at 494-99. 
 17.  Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
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samples . . . .”18 Citing Moore, the court noted “[t]he California Supreme 
Court . . . held that the use of the results of medical research inconsistent with 
the wishes of the donor was not conversion, because the donor had no property 
interest at stake after the donation was made . . . . Similarly [in Greenberg], the 
property right in blood and tissue samples also evaporates once the sample is 
voluntarily given to a third party.”19 It is also important to note that the 
Greenberg court adopted the same consequentialist reasoning articulated in 
Moore for denying the plaintiffs’ conversion claim. The Court plainly stated, 
“if adopted, the expansive theory championed by plaintiffs would cripple 
medical research as it would bestow a continuing right for donors to possess the 
results of any research conducted by the hospital.”20 
Washington University v. Catalona presented a similar issue before the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007. Dr. William Catalona was a urologist 
at Washington University where his primary research area was prostate cancer. 
During his nearly three-decade tenure at Washington University, he amassed a 
large biorepository of blood and tissue for prostate cancer research—both from 
his patients and through larger scale recruiting.21 Catalona accepted a new 
position at Northwestern in 2003 and sent letters to the research participants 
asking that they sign a form allowing their samples to be transferred from 
Washington University to his new employer. Washington University filed a 
declaratory action in 2003 that sought to establish their ownership of the 
repository amassed by Catalona and all of the biological samples that it 
contained. 
The court held in favor of Washington University, finding that the patients’ 
stored samples were inter vivos gifts donated to the university and remained its 
property whereby the individual donors could not re-assign the gifts to 
Catalona. This rationale is similar to that used by the Greenberg court; by 
framing the research participants as “donors” who made a “gift,” the court 
 
 18.  Id. at 1074. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 1076.The Greenberg court uses a similar argument in rejecting the plaintiff’s 
claim that the researchers failure to disclose their economic interests amounted to a lack of 
informed consent: “[D]isclosing economic interests has no support in established law, and 
more ominously, this requirement would have pernicious effects over medical research, as it 
would give each donor complete control over how medical research is used and who benefits 
from that research.” Id. at 1070. 
 21.  “At the time of the district court’s permanent injunction hearing in this case, more 
than 30,000 [research participants] were enrolled in WU prostate cancer research studies. 
About 2,500 to 3,000 [research participants] had been patients of Dr. Catalona. The 
Biorepository contains: (1) approximately 3,500 prostate tissue samples taken from patients 
of Dr. Catalona and other WU physicians within the Division; (2) about 100,000 blood or 
serum samples donated by over 28,000 men, 75% of whom were not patients of any WU 
physician, but rather were volunteers recruited through the media; and (3) DNA samples 
provided by approximately 4,400 men, which included patients of different WU physicians 
and relatives of those patients.” Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 671-72 (8th Cir. 
2007). 
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implicitly acknowledged that any residual property interest that the individuals 
might have in their excised tissue was relinquished by agreeing to participate in 
medical research.22 This leads to what has now become a jurisprudentially 
familiar result: individuals have diminished property interests in excised 
somatic cells and tissues used for research purposes. Taken together, these 
three cases indicate the parameters of a general default rule that excised human 
cells and tissues used in medical research are the property of the researcher 
and/or research institution rather than the individual donor. 
B. Embryos and Gametes 
Courts have taken a different approach to understanding individuals’ 
property interests in other forms of human cells, namely embryos and gametes. 
This section briefly describes two influential cases that highlight the way courts 
approach individuals’ property interests in this area. 
Davis v. Davis, a 1992 opinion from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, was 
one of the earliest judicial opinions to consider the proper disposition of frozen 
embryos held in a fertility clinic where there was not any preexisting agreement 
or contract to determine how unused embryos should be handled. The genetic 
parents, Mary Sue and Junior Davis, divorced; Mary Sue initially wanted to 
gestate the embryos and then wanted to donate them to an infertile couple while 
Junior wanted the embryos discarded. Not only did the couple not stipulate 
what should happen to any unused embryos prior to their divorce, but there was 
also no relevant state statute to determine the embryos’ fate. Thus, the court 
examined a number of scientific, ethical, and legal perspectives to determine 
how to proceed. Davis remains a leading case regarding the disposition of 
gametes and embryos because it provides a broad framework for courts to use 
when assessing this issue: 
Disputes involving the disposition of pre-embryos produced by in vitro 
fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the 
progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then 
their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior 
agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using 
the pre-embryos must be weighed.
23
 
But what is particularly important for this Article is the court’s reasoning 
on whether embryos are “persons” or “property” in determining progenitors’ 
rights with regards to their disposition in the absence of any contract or other 
agreement. The court concluded that embryos: 
[A]re not, strictly speaking, either “persons” or “property,” but occupy an 
interim category that entitles them to special respect because of their potential 
 
 22.  The court referenced the consent form and brochure distributed to research 
participants in coming to this decision. See id. at 674-75. 
 23.  Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
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for human life . . . . [The Davis’ interest] is not a true property interest. 
However, they do have an interest in the nature of ownership, to the extent 




Thus, the Davis court distinguished the property interest that individuals 
might have in embryos from other types of excised somatic cells and tissues, 
largely based upon their “potential for human life” or the capacity to develop 
into an autonomous human being. This potential is not enough to give 
individuals a standard property interest over embryos. But, it is enough, 
according to the court, to give the genetic parents authority to determine how 
the embryos will ultimately be used—which is the precise property interest that 
was sought by and denied to the cell and tissue progenitors in Moore, 
Greenberg, and Catalona. 
Decided four years after Davis, Hecht v. Superior Court is significant in 
that it applied the same “potential for human life” rationale for giving 
individuals a heightened property interest in gametes and not only embryos. 
Hecht concerned the disposition of fifteen sperm vials left to Deborah Hecht by 
her partner, William Kane, after his death. Hecht intended to use Kane’s sperm 
to attempt to conceive and give birth to a child. Kane’s two adult children 
objected, leading to the suit. Central to this case is whether or not Kane 
“owned” the sperm vials in a manner that allowed him to give this type of 
property to Hecht. Relying on Moore, Kane’s children argued that Kane could 
not have a property interest in his sperm or control its disposition once outside 
of his body much like the California Supreme Court held that Moore did not 
have a property interest in his excised cells. The California Court of Appeals 
rejected this application of Moore to gametes in the first of three Hecht 
decisions, noting that the “decedent had an interest, in the nature of ownership, 
to the extent that he had decision making authority [ ] to the sperm. . . . [that] 
falls within the broad definition of property.”25 Even though Kane was dead at 
the time of this dispute, the court’s inquiry focused largely on what type of 
interest Kane had in his sperm while alive and whether that allowed him to give 
it to Hecht.26 The court used Davis to distinguish Hecht from Moore to find a 
residual property interest in gametes that is akin to that found in embryos 
because of their shared potential to create life. The Hecht court wrote that 
sperm “is unlike other human tissue because it is ‘gametic material’ that can be 
used for reproduction . . . . [T]he value of sperm [as in embryos] lies in its 
potential to create a child . . . . [Therefore] decedent had an interest, in the 
nature of ownership . . . . [that] is sufficient to constitute ‘property.’”27 As in 
the embryo cases, donors’ intent remains primary in determining the 
 
 24.  Id. at 597 (emphasis added). 
 25.  Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 846 (1993). 
 26.  Kane’s will also stated that his sperm should be given to Hecht after his death. See 
Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 1292 (1996). 
 27.  Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850 (emphasis added). 
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disposition of gametes and frames the nature of the property interest involved. 
For example, in Estate of Kievernagel v. Kievernagel, the court cited Hecht in 
acknowledging that “gametic material, with its potential to produce life, is a 
unique type of property and thus not governed by the general laws relating to 
gifts or personal property or transfer of personal property upon death”28 so as 
to deny a widow’s claim to her late husband’s sperm precisely because he 
wanted the sperm destroyed when he died. To be sure, most cases regarding the 
disposition of excised embryos and gametes focus on ascertaining and giving 
effect (where discernable) to the intent of the parties as articulated in informed 
consent forms or other written agreements at the time of the procedure.29 
However, for the purposes of this Article, Davis and Hecht are important in that 
they exist outside of the realm of contractual or statutory interpretation to 
understand the residual property interests that parties retain in excised gametes 
and embryos as distinct from ordinary somatic cells because of their potential 
to become human life. 
C. Distinctions Between Cases Involving Somatic Cells and 
Gametes/Embryos 
There are at least two distinctions between these two sets of cases that are 
worth noting. First, the cases pertaining to somatic cells and tissues (Moore, 
Greenberg, Catalona) deal with disputes between patients/research participants 
and biomedical research entities while the embryo and gamete cases (Davis, 
Hecht) deal with disputes between individual litigants outside of the context of 
medical research. Thus, the courts’ discussion of property rights occurs in two 
different contexts where there are different sets of competing interests. For 
example, the cases dealing with somatic cells and tissues each stress the 
adverse impact that might occur to scientific research if patients and research 
participants retained a controlling property interest in their excised materials 
and how this may work against the public interest. This broader notion of 
efficient use of cells and tissues to yield a wider social benefit is absent from 
disputes concerning gametes and embryos. Instead, the litigants are dealing 
with issues pertaining to reproduction that have a different set of social and 
legal concerns such as the appropriate dispensation of property in probate 
matters, privacy, the right to procreate, and the right to not be a parent. This, 
however, may be a distinction without much of a difference. What is of interest 
 
 28.  In re Estate of Kievernagel, 166 Cal. App. 4th 1024, 1030 (2008). 
 29.  See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998), citing Davis in stating that “the 
relevant inquiry thus becomes who has dispositional authority over [the embryos]. Because 
that question is answered in this case by the parties’ agreement . . . we have no cause to 
decide whether the pre-zygotes are entitled to ‘special respect.’” Id. at 564-65; Litowitz v. 
Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002), noting that the court “based[d] [its] decision . . . solely 
upon the contractual rights of the parties under the pre-embryo cryopreservation contract 
with the Loma Linda Center for Fertility and In Vitro Fertilization.” Id. at 271. 
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to the many scholarly and judicial disquisitions on Moore and its progeny is the 
specific question of what property interests individuals have in excised cells 
and tissue, regardless of whether the person exerting a competing claim is a 
scientist or an ex-spouse. The differential contexts that underlie the 
juxtaposition of property interests in somatic cells and tissues versus those in 
gametes and embryos should not disqualify such analyses as an apples and 
oranges comparison; indeed, it is not uncommon for courts to look across 
contexts to clarify the precise property interest involved.30 Rather, these cases 
should be looked at broadly and comparatively to draw greater scrutiny to 
default rules conferring differential property interests in somatic cells and 
gametes/embryos. 
Second, the cases pertaining to gametes and embryos place a higher 
premium on fulfilling the progenitors’ intent at the time of removal. For 
example, the Hecht court found that Kane had sufficient interest in his sperm 
for it to constitute property in terms of conferring jurisdiction of the dispute to 
the Probate Court.31 But much of this finding is driven by the court’s 
acknowledgement that gametes are a special type of property that should be 
disposed of according to the donor’s intent. In rejecting the trial court’s order to 
destroy the sperm, the appellate court noted that Kane’s “will evidences the 
decedent’s intent that Hecht, should she so desire, is to receive his sperm stored 
in the sperm bank to bear his child posthumously.”32 The Hecht court relied 
heavily upon the test set forth by Davis to determine the dispensation of 
gametes when there is a dispute, where primacy is given to the “preferences of 
the progenitors.”33 Given the clarity of Kane’s intent as expressed in his will, 
the Hecht court simply applied Kane’s intent as articulated.34 
 
 30.  See, e.g., Janicki v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 744 A.2d 963, 970-71 (Conn. 1999). 
 31.  Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 850. 
 32.  Id. at 850-51. 
 33.  The full test elaborated by the Davis court states: “[W]e hold that disputes 
involving the disposition of pre-embryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be 
resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be 
ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should 
be carried out. If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using 
or not using the pre-embryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid 
procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of 
achieving parenthood by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question. If no other 
reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the pre-embryos to achieve 
pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the pre-embryos 
intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the 
greater interest and should prevail.” Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). 
 34.  “Given the procedural posture of this case, and the fact that, for purposes of 
addressing real parties’ arguments, we are assuming that decedent intended to allow Hecht to 
use his sperm for posthumous artificial insemination, it is premature for us to apply the 
Davis test. At this point, the only issue which we address is whether artificial insemination 
with the sperm of a decedent violates public policy. There is nothing in Davis which 
indicates that such artificial insemination violates public policy.” Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 
859. 
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Intent arguably cuts the other way in cases dealing with somatic cells and 
tissues. In each of these cases, litigation arose out of plaintiffs’ contention that 
their cells or tissues were being used in a manner inconsistent with their intent 
or expectations at the time they donated the biological materials. Yet, courts 
have consistently disregarded these claims in favor of conferring a controlling 
property interest to researchers once the cells or tissues have been excised—
even when, as in Moore, the court simultaneously finds that the researcher 
breached his disclosure obligations in a manner that may very well have altered 
the patient’s medical decision-making.35 The Moore court specifically denied 
the conversion claim because they concluded that Moore “clearly did not 
expect to retain possession of his cells following their removal”36 and that it 
would be inappropriate to acknowledge any lingering property interest that 
legitimizes the conversion claim since such recognition had not been granted 
by previous courts. Such a ruling would be contrary to California statutes that 
restrict patient interest in excised cells. Moreover, the Court also found that the 
patented cell line was sufficiently different to preclude Moore’s claim to 
ownership. Thus, the Court disregarded Moore’s intent and expectations as 
expressed in the suit. Viewed another way, they only looked at what his 
intent/expectations could legally be at the time the cells were excised rather 
than taking seriously his actual intent/expectations as expressed during the 
litigation. The Greenberg court also articulated this comparatively thin 
understanding of intent in the context of somatic cells and tissues, saying that 
the tissues in question were donated37 and that, following Moore, researchers’ 
use of the materials in a manner inconsistent with the donors’ intent or 
expectations was irrelevant since they no longer had a legal interest in them.38 
Where Greenberg used the language of “donation” to characterize the transfer 
of property interest in somatic tissues and to curtail any serious consideration of 
the plaintiff’s intent, Catalona embraced the language of “gift” to achieve 
similar ends: 
Our conclusion that the [research participants] intended to make gifts of their 
biological samples at the time of their donation is bolstered further by the 
language of the brochure, which characterized the [research participants’] 
donations as “a free and generous gift of [biological materials] to research that 
may benefit society.” The brochure’s acknowledgment that donated materials 
may be shared with non-WU researchers, without any further authorization 
 
 35.  Though the Moore court did not allow Moore’s conversion claim, they nonetheless 
held that “a physician who is seeking a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in 
order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose 
personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may 
affect his medical judgment.” Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 
1990). 
 36.  Id. at 488-89. 
 37.  Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 
(S.D. Fla. 2003). 
 38.  Id. at 1074 (citing Moore, 51 Cal.3d 120). 
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needed from the [research participants], informed the [research participants] 
they would relinquish or abandon the right to designate the particular 
destination of their biological materials upon agreeing to participate in a 
medical research study. Such language, considered together with the consent 
form, cannot reasonably be characterized as reflecting the [research 
participants’] intention either to entrust their samples solely to Dr. Catalona or 
to transfer the samples in some legal form other than a gift.
39
 
Thus, the potential for gametes and embryos to develop into autonomous 
human beings constitutes a legally significant default rule that amplifies 
donors’ intent so as to acknowledge a property interest that exists after 
removal. The inability of somatic cells and tissues to generate human beings 
diminishes the seriousness in which courts consider donors’ intent—even when 
the use of these materials is so egregiously inconsistent with their desires that it 
generates litigation—leading courts to effectively decline any property interests 
that individuals have to them or any derivative product. Therefore, the type of 
cell or tissue in question, in terms of its ability to create or become a human 
being, appears to be the most legally significant variable in how the court 
determines whether individuals maintain a residual property interest in 
extracorporeal materials. Individuals’ diminished property interest in somatic 
cells and tissues and heightened property interest in gametes and embryos are 
justified by what is perceived to be a clear dividing line: the potential to 
become human life. In the next section, we discuss how the development of 
iPSCs poses serious challenges to this default rule. 
II. INDUCED PLURIPOTENT STEM CELLS: WHAT THEY ARE, HOW THEY WORK, 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPERTY LAW 
A. A Brief Description of the Technology 
The biomedical promise and excitement surrounding stem cells lies in their 
ability to differentiate into different types of cells. Stem cells are unlike other 
cells in three regards:40 (1) they are unspecialized (i.e. they do not have tissue-
specific structures that limit them to only performing particular functions41); 
 
 39.  Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674-75 (8th Cir. 2007). The court noted 
that the research participants’ (RP’s) options with regards to directing the use of their tissues 
were quite limited: “The RPs’ subsequent rights to their biological materials were expressly 
limited to the option to discontinue participation in the study to avoid answering additional 
questions, donating more biological materials, or allowing their biological materials to be 
used for further research. Beyond these particular and limited rights, the RPs retained no 
greater interest with regard to their biological materials. Such rights cannot be equated with 
or interpreted to include the broad privileges or proprietary interests advocated by the 
defendants.” Id. at 675. 
 40.  See generally NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, STEM CELL BASICS (2009), available at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/info/basics/basics2.asp. 
 41.  Id. 
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(2) they can divide and replicate for a long time; and (3) they can differentiate 
into specialized cells. Typically, stem cells come in two types: adult and 
embryonic. Adult stem cells are mature stem cells found in particular tissues 
(bone marrow, heart, etc.) of mature organisms and “are responsible for 
renewing and repairing the body’s specialized cells.”42 Adult stem cells are 
multipotent, meaning that they ordinarily can only differentiate (become more 
specialized) into a limited number of cell types. Embryonic stem cells, which 
are coaxed from early stage human embryos, are unique in that they are 
pluripotent, meaning that they can differentiate into derivatives of any of the 
three main categories of human tissues—“ectoderm (skin, nerves, brain), 
mesoderm (bone, muscle), and endoderm (lungs, digestive system)”43—as well 
as germ cells that are the precursors for gametes. 
Pluripotency is a key trait; it lays the foundation for the promise of 
regenerative medicine where patient-specific tissues can be developed to treat 
many illnesses. For example, one approach might involve treating heart disease 
by employing embryonic stem cells to develop patient-specific replacement 
cells that might be able to repair damaged heart tissue.44 Similarly, embryonic 
stem cells might be used to develop patient-specific nerve tissue that might 
regenerate spinal cord tissues to help give movement back to paralyzed 
individuals.45 Thus, many researchers believe that embryonic stem cells’ 
pluripotency creates an avenue of research that is more promising than the 
limitations associated with adult stem cells, which do not exhibit this trait. 
However, the promise behind embryonic stem cells is not without ethical 
controversy. Obtaining access to these pluripotent stem cells requires 
destroying embryos. Many people consider embryos to be no less a form of 
human life than an actual human being, making it ethically problematic to 
destroy one form of life to save or heal another. This has led to a form of stem 
cell politics that mirrors abortion politics, where competing definitions of when 
life begins often determines how individuals understand the legitimacy of this 
medical technique. 
It is in this context that the 2007 discovery of iPSCs was heralded as a new 
technology that might resolve this ethical and political problem. By adding a 
handful of genes to somatic cells and providing the right laboratory 
environment, these cells can be “induced” or “reprogrammed” to revert back to 
a pluripotent state that exhibits the same characteristics as embryonic stem 
 
 42.  Insoo Hyun, Stem Cells, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE 
HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND 
CAMPAIGNS, 159, 159 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See generally Siamak Davani et al., Can Stem Cells Mend a Broken Heart, 65 
CARDIOVASCULAR RESEARCH 305, 310 (2005). 
 45.  See generally M.A. Woodbury, Hans Keirstead Can Make Mice Walk Again (and 
Humans Too?), ESQUIRE MAGAZINE, Nov. 17, 2009, available at http://www.esquire.com/ 
features/best-and-brightest-2009/human-embryonic-stem-cell-research-1209. 
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cells—all without having to destroy an embryo.46 These reprogrammed cells 
can, in effect, give rise to an entirely new organism from somatic cells—which 
has not yet been done with humans but was demonstrated by two separate 
teams in 2009 with mice.47 Using somatic cells taken from the skin of adult 
mice, these researchers used a virus to inject four genes into mice cells, which 
reprogrammed the cells to a state of pluripotency, causing them to exhibit the 
same plasticity as embryonic stem cells. They were then implanted in the 
acellular surrounding material of a nonviable “tetraploid” embryo that had its 
own cells modified; the new embryo with the reprogrammed somatic cells then 
developed into new baby mice. iPSCs have also been used to reprogram mouse 
somatic cells into pluripotent cells that were then differentiated into precursor 
germ cells that were used in fertilization.48 While these mouse experiments 
pertaining to reproduction via iPSCs have not yet been demonstrated with 
human somatic cells, there is growing evidence that human applications are 
feasible and a logical extension of these animal experiments.49 
B. Potential Applications of iPSC Research With Human Cells 
There are several potential applications of iPSC research with human cells 
that might directly implicate the property interests of individual cell and tissue 
donors. It has been estimated that there are over 270 million tissue samples 
stored in U.S. biobanks alone, with an additional 20 million samples being 
added every year.50 While some of these biobanks contain eggs, sperm, and 
embryos, millions of these samples are ordinary somatic cells and tissues used 
by scientists to conduct research that may lead to new therapies and treatments. 
While there is a robust debate regarding biobank governance to manage their 
disposition and to protect patients from privacy intrusions or from other harms 
 
 46.  See generally Takahashi et al., supra note 5; Yu et al., supra note 6. 
 47.  See generally Lan Kang et al., iPS Cells Can Support Full-Term Development of 
Tetraploid Blastocyst-Complemented Embryos, 5 CELL STEM CELL 1, 1-4 (2009); Xiao-yang 
Zhao et al., iPS Cells Produce Viable Mice Through Tetraploid Complementation, 461 
NATURE 86, 86-89 (2009). 
 48.  Masanori Imamura et al., Induction of Primordial Germ Cells From Mouse 
Induced Pluripotent Stem Cells Derived from Adult Hepatocytes, 77 MOLECULAR REPROD. & 
DEV. 802, 808 (2010); Natalie de Souza, Gametes from Stem Cells, 8 NATURE METHODS 789, 
789 (2011). 
 49.  See Charles A. Easley IV et. al., Direct Differentiation of Human Pluripotent Stem 
Cells into Haploid Spermatogenic Cells, 2 CELL REPORTS 440, 443-44 (2012) (evidencing 
advances in using iPSC technology to turn human somatic cells into gametes); Rosa 
Silverman, Scientists Create Sperm from Skin Sample, UK TELEGRAPH, Aug. 29, 2012, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/9505267/Scientists-create-sperm-from-
skin-sample.html. The study’s lead author told the UK Telegraph “[n]o one has been able to 
make human sperm from pluripotent stem cells . . . in the lab, but this research indicates it 
might be possible.” 
 50.  Susanne B. Haga & Laura M. Beskow, Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of 
Biobanks for Genetics Research, 60 ADVANCES IN GENETICS 505, 506 (2008). 
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that may lead to having their tissues identified,51 the possibility that somatic 
cells in biobanks might be used for iPSC research raises important questions for 
property law that have not even been articulated yet alone addressed. 
Although iPSC research has been touted as resolving debates regarding the 
ethics of destroying embryos to harvest pluripotent stem cells, some 
commentators have pointed to new ethical problems created by this emerging 
technology. One looming ethical issue is the notion of consent. It is common 
practice that individuals provide written consent to physicians and researchers 
to use their excised cell and tissue samples for research. However, patients and 
research participants often do this with an implicit understanding that there are 
certain biological limitations regarding what can be done with their somatic 
cells and tissues. The advent of iPSCs, however, suggests radically different 
possibilities—including the reprogramming of somatic cells into precursor 
germ cells that can mature into gametes that can be fertilized and grow into a 
living person. 
Standard informed consent forms typically do not contemplate this 
possibility. To use somatic cells obtained under existing informed consent 
processes for iPSC research without raising the new possibilities to patients and 
research participants is ethically problematic for the obvious reasons that many 
people would object to their cells being used in a manner that may 
indiscriminately create new life that would be genetically related to them.52 
Another concern is privacy. iPSC lines derived from a living individual 
contains genetic information about the donor and his/her relatives that may be 
sensitive. De-identification may not always be desirable in the context of iPSC 
research for both clinical and technical reasons.53 
The third major ethical issue with iPSC research is that it is a relatively 
straightforward process that is not difficult to replicate.54 In short, 
 
 51.  See generally David E. Winickoff & Richard N. Winickoff, The Charitable Trust 
as a Model for Genomic Biobanks, 349 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1180, 1182-83 (2003). 
 52.  See generally Katriina Aalto-Setälä et al., Obtaining Consent for Future Research 
with Induced Pluripotent Cells: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 PLOS BIOLOGY 204, 207 
(2009). 
 53.  Amy Zarzeczny et al., iPS Cells: Mapping the Policy Issues, 139 CELL 1032, 1033 
(2009). “One way for researchers to address these [privacy] concerns is to de-identify or 
anonymize the data at the time of donation. However, there are various problems with this 
approach. First, there are clinical, research, and policy reasons why anonymization (that is, 
de-linkage from identifiable information) may not be an ideal approach. For instance, future 
clinical applications (e.g. transplantation) may necessitate obtaining follow up information 
about the donor’s health status. Second, with the advent of large-scale genome-wide 
association studies, technology now exists to detect a specific individual’s single nucleotide 
polymorphism, even when de-identified and in a pooled data set.” 
 54.  David Cyranoski, 5 Things to Know Before Jumping on the iPS Bandwagon, 452 
NATURE 406, 406 (2008). Although the process is rather straightforward, iPS cells can be 
rather difficult to develop. Nature’s David Cyranoski reports that “as simple as this 
procedure might seem, iPS cells are not easy to make. Kathrin Plath at the University of 
California, Los Angeles estimates that each of the reprogramming genes (she used six) has 
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reprogramming somatic body cells into a pluripotent state only requires 
inserting four genes in culture to trigger the process of de-differentiation that 
turns a regular somatic cell (e.g. skin) into a pluripotent state55 that can 
differentiate into reproductive cells. Shinya Yamanaka, who led one of the first 
teams to discover iPS cells stated “we are presenting new ethical issues, maybe 
worse ones, because many people can do this—and without telling anybody.”56 
As an editorial from Nature noted, “the facility with which iPS cells can be 
derived could make it easier to derive gametes from any person, living or 
dead.”57 This combination of (a) a transformative technology that is (b) 
straightforward to conduct with (c) widely accessible raw materials (somatic 
cells and tissues) stored by the millions in biobanks and (d) a legal regime 
whereby the progenitors of these raw materials have no legal interest in their 
own cells and tissues (while also remaining vulnerable to third party usage that 
could be quite damaging) might produce disputes and unwanted outcomes of an 
order of magnitude that was previously unimaginable. Put bluntly, any person 
who has had a tissue biopsy stored in a biobank may now, at least theoretically, 
become a genetic parent without their consent. 
One particularly sensitive area of research is the use of iPSCs for 
reproductive medicine. The specter of this type of research draws attention not 
only to the fraught nature of iPSC research in the current bioethical and 
biomedical environments but also to its legally problematic dynamics. The 
advent of iPSCs implicate property interests in ways that obliterate the rationale 
for the existing default rules that apportion differential property interests 
according to cells’ potential to create new human beings. For example, to the 
extent that iPSC research might be able to reprogram and differentiate somatic 
cells into reproductive cells that can become mature gametes, researchers may 
find iPSC-derived gametes “useful both for understanding gametogenesis and 
as a potential infertility treatment [whereby] gametes derived from iPS cells 
would have virtually the same DNA as the somatic cell donor.”58 A less 
scrupulous researcher could use iPSC methods and readily available somatic 
cells and tissues to pursue human cloning—even in jurisdictions that ban 
reproductive cloning by other means.59 Beyond notions of privacy and consent, 
 
only a 15% chance of making it into a given cell. Even if they all make it, the cell has only a 
5% chance of being fully reprogrammed. The low efficiency presents a riddle for scientists, 
but with millions of cells available in a biopsy sample, it is not a roadblock.” 
 55.  Justin Lowenthal et al., Specimen Collection for Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell 
Research: Harmonizing the Approach to Informed Consent, 1 STEM CELLS TRANSLATIONAL 
MED. 409, 409 (2012). “Although recent evidence has tempered the hope that translating 
these technologies toward new therapies will be easy, there is great interest in using iPSC 
lines to advance translational goals. A broad range of human tissue types are currently being 
procured to facilitate the generation of iPSC lines.” 
 56.  Cyranoski, supra note 54, at 408. 
 57.  New Sources of Sex Cells, 452 NATURE 913, 913 (2008) 
 58.  Aalto-Setälä et al., supra note 52, at 206. 
 59.  “In theory, injecting human iPSCs into a human tetraploid blastocyst could create 
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it is likely that scenarios such as these would be quite troubling to the somatic 
cell donor if they came to pass for the precise reasons that law has recognized a 
residual property interest in gametes and embryos: the potential to create new 
individuals intuitively gives donors a heightened interest in how their cells are 
used, lest a genetically related version of themselves be created without their 
knowledge or against their wishes. Yet, in the existing legal regime, donors of 
somatic cells and tissues would have no recourse to even prevent a scientist 
from pursuing the most questionable types of research with their biological 
materials. 
III. NORMATIVE PROPOSALS 
iPSCs pose a dramatic challenge to this default rule in property law, which 
recognizes an individual’s property interests in excised gametes and embryos 
based on their “potential for human life” while refusing any corollary property 
interest in excised somatic cells. While research with iPSCs in humans is in its 
early stages, the developments with mice cells suggest that it may soon be 
possible for excised human somatic cells to be reprogrammed and 
differentiated into reproductive cells, which would have the very potential for 
life that courts have identified as a prerequisite for having a residual property 
interest in excised cells. Therefore, iPSCs can make it technically feasible for 
any regular somatic cell—from an individual’s hair, skin, or Moore’s storied 
spleen—to be reprogrammed in a manner that can create life. Somatic cells 
now arguably have the same potential to become new human beings that 
embryos and gametes do, but without a corresponding property interest to 
prevent misuse or to respect individuals’ wishes concerning the disposition of 
such cells. While the development of iPSCs have led to important 
reconsiderations regarding informed consent60 and intellectual property,61 
 
a child who is a clone of the somatic cell donor and whose placenta comes from the donor(s) 
of the blastomeres. . . . [M]any current policies ban only human reproductive cloning by 
somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT).” Bernard Lo et al., Cloning Mice and Men: 
Prohibiting the Use of iPS Cells for Human Reproductive Cloning, 6 CELL STEM CELL 16, 16 
(2010). 
 60.  See Lowenthal et al., supra note 55. The development of iPSCs creates important 
questions regarding informed consent, i.e. how can a patient consent to donating tissues that 
may be subject to iPSC research when it is not yet entirely clear what that research might 
entail. It is interesting to note that while they do not speak to the exact issues discussed in 
this Article, existing regulations for human embryonic stem cells do not give donors 
downstream control over their usage. For example, the NIH Guidelines on Human Stem Cell 
Research only states that donors “should have been informed that they retained the right to 
withdraw consent for the donation of the embryo” and that they should also be informed that 
“the results of research using [human embryonic stem cells] may have commercial potential, 
and that the donor(s) would not receive financial or any other benefits from any such 
commercial development.” NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH GUIDELINES ON HUMAN STEM 
CELL RESEARCH, II(A)(3)(d)(iii), II(A)(3)(e)(vi) (2009) (emphasis added), available at 
http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/2009guidelines.htm. Guidelines from the California Institute 
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scholars have not identified nor discussed the tensions created for property law. 
This section fills this void by first discussing the existing relevant literature. 
We then offer a three-part proposal that addresses the challenges posed by 
iPSCs for property law and then discuss concerns that may be raised by our 
recommendations. 
A. Existing Literature 
Legal scholars have not discussed the transformative challenges that iPSCs 
pose for property law. The scholarly literature regarding property interest in 
human cells and tissues has largely focused on exploring different theoretical or 
doctrinal bases to rethink the default rules established by Moore—i.e., that 
individuals do not have a property interest in their excised somatic cells. 
Scholars have been largely critical of Moore’s holding and have offered 
alternative paradigms as solutions. For example, Robin Feldman has recently 
argued that “[i]t defies common sense to say that an individual lab can hold 
property rights in the tangible cells removed from a person’s body while the 
person whose body supplied the cells cannot.”62 This intuitive understanding 
that Moore was incorrectly decided leads Feldman to urge courts to revisit the 
issue in light of the knowledge gleaned through decades of experience since the 
initial decision.63 Pilar Ossorio shares a similar normative sensibility64 in 
arguing that a formal transfer (gift, sale, etc.) should be needed before a 
researcher can use someone else’s tissues for their own purposes.65 Radhika 
 
of Regenerative Medicine (CIRM)—the largest state level program for stem cell funding – 
note that “donor[s] will have no legal or financial interest in any commercial development 
resulting from the research” and that “a donor must be given the opportunity to impose 
restrictions on future uses of donated materials [but that] researchers may choose to use 
materials only from donors who agree to all future uses without restriction.” CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 17, § 100100(b)(1)(I), § 100100(b)(2)(2012). 
 61.  See Robin Feldman & Deborah Furth, The Intellectual Property Landscape for iPS 
Cells, 3 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 16 (2010). 
 62.  Robin Feldman, Whose Body Is It Anyway? Human Cells and the Strange Effects 
of Property and Intellectual Property Law, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1377, 1384 (2011). 
 63.  “Our enthusiasm and appreciation for the miraculous advances of science should 
not blind us to the necessity of thinking through the interests of the people whose cells 
provide the raw materials, nor should it obviate the necessity of ensuring that those raw 
materials are properly obtained. Perhaps courts in the appropriate jurisdictions will feel 
moved to revisit these issues, now that we have decades of experience with this type of 
scientific research.” Id. at 1385. 
 64.  “If one accepts the proposition ‘my body belongs to me,’ then I think there is a 
strong argument that extracorporeal bodily materials should be considered, initially, the 
property of the person from whom it was derived. . . . Does changing the location of bodily 
material from within my body to outside my body change my property rights in that 
material? I do not think so.” Pilar N. Ossorio, Property Rights and Human Bodies, in WHO 
OWNS LIFE?, 223, 234-35 (David Magnus, Arthur Caplan, & Glenn McGee eds., 2002). 
 65.  Ossorio states that “the individual from whom bodily materials are derived [should 
be] the initial owner of those materials, and that legitimate transfers from them to scientists 
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Rao examines the overlapping legal regimes of property, contract, and privacy 
to tease out the incoherence that law applies to individuals’ rights and 
relationships to excised cells and tissues. She suggests a model of property in 
the human body as stewardship, where individuals collectively possess 
themselves in a public trust, rather than being outright owners.66 
Not all commentators find the default rules established by Moore and 
subsequent cases troubling. For example, Hakimian and Korn argue that the 
Moore regime of diminished individual property interest in excised cells is 
justifiable: 
Because the benefits of medical knowledge derived from tissue research 
potentially accrue to all individuals and future generations, society may justify 
the expansive use of these valuable resources based on the principle of justice. 
Human tissue specimens are a unique and irreplaceable research resource, and 
society’s strong interest in the advancement of medical knowledge deserves a 
coherent and internally consistent legal, regulatory, and ethical framework to 
govern specimen use. 
67
 
Similarly, Russell Korobkin argues that Moore correctly established an 
important default rule—one based on contract rather than property—of no 
compensation for transactions pertaining to human tissues.68 Nevertheless, 
much of the literature surrounding Moore has expressed dissatisfaction with 
both the outcome and default rules established by the case, which has led to 
proposals for alternative models. For example, Charlotte Harrison has 
suggested a hybrid approach that falls between notions of altruism and private 
property, such that there would be “a general rule of donation for research 
tissue at the time it is acquired” which would “provide an objective, non-
market mechanism for compensation after research use for unusual cases in 
which samples prove to have significant commercial utility.”69 Donna Gitter 
 
must take place before scientists can rightfully possess, use, or sell those materials, or 
exclude others from doing so.” Id. at 241. 
 66.  Radhika Rao, Genes and Spleens: Property, Contract, or Privacy Rights in the 
Human Body, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 371, 379-80 (2007). See also Rao, supra note 8. 
 67.  Rina Hakimian & David Korn, Ownership and Use of Tissue Specimens for 
Research, 292 JAMA 2500, 2504 (2004). 
 68.  Korobkin notes “[i]n the twenty-first century, biotechnology is becoming 
increasingly important in medical research. If biomedicine is able to fulfill the hopes of the 
scientific community by creating a new paradigm for the treatment of disease – one in which 
biological agents regenerate diseased or dead tissues – disembodied tissues could become the 
cures for a variety of ailments. It is likely that scientists around the world will need a 
tremendous amount of human tissues of all types just to mount the research effort, regardless 
of whether the promise is ever actually fulfilled. In the new era of biomedical technology, it 
is critically important for the law to facilitate tissue transactions efficiently. This, in turn 
requires understanding and embracing the underlying wisdom of Moore.” Russell Korobkin, 
“No Compensation” or “Pro Compensation”: Moore v. Regents and Default Rules for 
Human Tissue Donations, 40 J. HEALTH L. 1, 27 (2007). 
 69.  Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: Alternative Models for 
Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77, 78 (2002). 
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takes a different approach in proposing that Congress recognize individuals’ 
enduring property interest in excised human tissues by enacting legislation that 
not only allows research participants to sell human tissues for research 
purposes but also expressly provides for a tort of conversion if researchers 
wrongly use such materials.70 
Despite these wide ranging perspectives, there has been no conversation in 
the literature—legal, biomedical, or otherwise—on how the development of 
iPSCs significantly complicates the existing conversation on property interests 
in excised human cells and tissues.71 What is needed is a discussion of how 
iPSCs might shift the empirical footing underneath these theoretical, policy, 
and doctrinal conversations by making the existing logic behind the differential 
treatment of somatic cells and gametes/embryos largely incoherent. Prior to the 
development of iPSCs, the default rule regarding individuals’ property interests 
in excised cells worked reasonably well by efficiently giving scientists access 
to research materials without exposing donors to the risk that their cells could 
be used by third parties to create new humans with a genetic tie to them. The 
default rule acts as a firewall in acknowledging a residual property interest in 
gametes and embryos outside of the body so that progenitors can control their 
disposition. But iPSC research disrupts the protections afforded by this default 
rule by giving somatic cells the potential to create human life without extending 
a residual property interest to donors so that they may limit the use of somatic 
cells for reproductive purposes. A model is needed that allows the law to co-
evolve with technology in a manner that is least disruptive to the existing 
default rules. Yet it is also important to maintain the sensibilities of promoting 
efficient research with somatic cells and tissues while also giving donors a 
heightened property interest in excised cells with reproductive abilities. Here, 
we propose a three-part approach. 
B. A Three-part Proposal 
1. Self-imposed moratorium on using iPSCs for human reproduction 
To address the jurisprudential instability in property law created by iPSCs, 
we first argue that the research community should implement a self-imposed 
moratorium on applications of iPSC research that pursue human reproduction 
 
 70.  Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal 
Recognition of Human Research Participants’ Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 339-41 (2004). 
 71.  Zarzeczny et al. come the closest to raising these issues (albeit in a non-legal 
journal article) by discussing the possibility of “reach through rights” stemming from iPSC 
research, whereby donors may have a controlling interest in the use of cell lines resulting 
from their tissues. However, this does not speak to the issue identified in this Article, i.e. that 
iPSCs complicate existing default rules pertaining to individuals’ property interest in excised 
biological materials. See Zarzeczny et al., supra note 53, at 1034. 
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with somatic cells from individuals who have not specifically given informed 
consent for their biological materials to be used in this manner. We are not the 
first to suggest that certain types of iPSC research should not proceed. Bernard 
Lo et al. have argued for a moratorium in relation to the potential use of iPSCs 
for reproductive cloning purposes, citing both safety and ethical concerns.72 
However, the manner in which iPSC research potentially destabilizes the 
existing default rules pertaining to property law suggests that this provides 
another important reason to stop human reproductive applications with somatic 
cells from individuals who have not specifically consented to this use until 
further legal and policy deliberations can take place. 
We do not suggest that iPSC research pertaining to animal models should 
stop. Nor do we necessarily suggest that all iPSC research with human cells 
should cease. We do, however, find the safety and ethical concerns pertaining 
to human reproductive cloning raised by Lo and his colleagues to be quite 
persuasive. Accordingly, we specifically tailor this first part of our proposal to 
the indeterminate property interest raised by using somatic cells from non-
consenting individuals for iPSC research,73 to the extent that this technology 
may give somatic cells the same potential to become human life as gametes and 
embryos, where progenitors retain a property interest after excision. We believe 
that the scientific community should take a leadership role in assessing and 
resolving the tensions regarding the ownership of excised biological cells 
created by iPSC research. This should start with a self-imposed moratorium on 
the most questionable aspect of this technology—research that results in the 
creation of reproductive cells that have the potential to create life and whose 
donors did not specifically consent to this purpose. While some may argue that 
a self-imposed moratorium would not be effective in stopping this research, we 
believe that research institutions and funding organizations can provide the 
appropriate combination of incentives and disincentives to require clear consent 
from donors that unequivocally demonstrates their understanding that their 
cells will be used for iPSC research and that they appreciate the full range of 
potential outcomes. For the scientific community to not take the lead with this 
 
 72.  “There continue to be compelling safety reasons to ban human reproductive 
cloning. Existing laws and professional guidelines should be carefully revised to cover 
tetraploid complementation with iPSCs and other technologies in addition to [somatic cell 
nuclear transfer], thereby broadening the ban on attempts at reproductive cloning to existing 
and future technologies.” Lo et al., supra note 59, at 20. 
 73.  Aalto-Setälä et al. discuss the importance of consent in iPSC research, noting that 
“iPS cells are an exciting new approach to developing pluripotent stem cell lines that are 
genetically identical to people with known phenotypes. While they avoid the ethical issues 
inherent in embryonic stem cells, they do raise some ethical concerns regarding consent for 
future research. Obtaining consent for fundamental downstream research with iPS cells, 
together with offering the options of allowing recontact by researchers and giving permission 
for additional sensitive types of future research, will show respect for somatic cell donors, 
promote public trust in stem cell research, and allow optimal use of scientific discoveries.” 
Aalto-Setälä et al., supra note 52, at 207. 
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rather nominal proposal risks creating the perception that they are more 
interested in preserving the unadulterated commercial potential of iPSC 
research rather than respecting the law’s concern with preserving individuals’ 
property interests in excised cells with the potential to create human life. This 
perception, if fostered by the research community’s reluctance, may lead to 
distrust among potential research participants. This may stifle development of 
human applications of this technology as well as others. We believe that this 
moratorium should only be in place for a limited period, at least until the 
proposal’s second part is in place. 
2. Legislative action 
Second, we argue that Congress should consider legislation that 
acknowledges a property interest in excised somatic cells that vests back to the 
progenitor once these cells are reprogrammed to a state of pluripotency and 
differentiated into reproductive cells. Since the characteristic that destabilizes 
the existing default rules is induced pluripotency that can lead to the creation of 
reproductive cells—the outermost point at which a somatic cell has the 
potential to create an independent human organism—it makes clear legal and 
scientific sense to protect individuals’ property interests at this point like any 
other excised reproductive cell with this potential. To the extent that this has 
been the key rationale for the differential property interests given to these cells, 
Congress can quickly and logically bring uniformity to this area of property law 
by extending existing property interests in gametes and embryos to somatic 
cells at the moment they cease to function as ordinary body cells and obtain 
reproductive capacity through the processes of induced pluripotency and 
differentiation. Such Congressional action would provide the most protection to 
potential research participants and encourages iPSC researchers to specifically 
seek informed consent from the progenitors of somatic cells and tissues. 
3. Judicial action 
Lastly, in light of these scientific developments and proposed 
Congressional actions, we argue that courts should distinguish Moore to clearly 
identify a property interest in excised somatic cells that are reprogrammed and 
differentiated into reproductive cells through the processes of induced 
pluripotency. This will add further consistency to the existing jurisprudence by 
demonstrating that the acknowledgement of a property interest in somatic cells 
that have been reprogrammed and differentiated into reproductive cells is not a 
departure from the existing default rules. Rather, it is consistent with the court’s 
longstanding emphasis on protecting individuals’ interests in excised biological 
materials that have the potential to create autonomous human beings. To the 
extent that iPSCs may not be the last technique to confer pluripotency to 
somatic cells, such judicial pronouncements can create a stable paradigm that 
protects individual property interests. It can also provide a predictable research 
Fall 2012] MOORE IS LESS 77 
environment for researchers seeking consistency in how to handle excised cells 
and tissues and how to assess the commercial viability of their research. 
C. Three Possible Objections 
There are at least three different concerns to this proposal that merit 
discussion. First, there is the argument that the proposed approach is overly 
broad. Many in the research community may argue that iPSC research can go 
forward without any type of self-imposed moratorium, Congressional action, or 
judicial affirmation as scientists can be trusted to not abuse donors’ samples, 
the public’s trust, or existing ethical guidelines. However, we argue that this 
issue is too important to allow human applications of iPSC research to exist 
within the status quo default rules as this may lead to the existing paradigm’s 
perversion. Scientists are given a default property interest in excised somatic 
cells because they are ostensibly of little use to most individuals. Yet, this rule 
can now “lock out” individuals from any property interest in their own cells 
once they are reprogrammed and differentiated into reproductive cells with the 
potential to become life. Our proposal is a logical extension of the current 
default rules. We simply argue that law should extend the same property 
interest to somatic cells that are conferred to gametes and embryos once these 
somatic cells are reprogrammed and differentiated to exhibit traits that are 
substantially similar to those of ordinary reproductive cells—and therefore 
have the potential to become new human beings. 
A second concern is that the vesting feature of our proposal—where 
Congressional action would confer a property interest to somatic cell donors 
once their cells have been reprogrammed and differentiated into reproductive 
cells—is too burdensome to be functional; it would require each and every 
somatic sample to be tracked in light of the possibility that it might be used for 
iPSC research. However, this concern overstates the issue. Our proposal is 
designed to incentivize the creation of separate biobanks where somatic cell 
and tissue donors have specifically consented to the use of their samples for 
iPSC research. Thus, the point of Congressional action of this nature is for the 
market and scientific community to develop a workable model outside of 
requiring the tracking of all banked biological samples on the off chance that 
they may be useful to iPSC researchers. The creation of separate biobanks with 
donors fully consented about the prospects of their samples being used for iPSC 
research can create new efficiencies in that researchers can have confidence 
that they are using samples in an ethically appropriate manner and that donors 
are fully aware of the potential use of their samples. 
A third objection that may be raised by this proposal is that it introduces 
unnecessary instability in this area of law and threatens the established property 
interests conferred to researchers through the default rules established by 
Moore, Davis, Hecht, and other cases. Put differently: leave well enough alone. 
This possible objection both understates and overstates the significance of the 
proposal being made. It understates it in that what might be considered “well 
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enough” for the research community may not be the case for individual cell and 
tissue donors. Yet, it also overstates things in that the proposal does not take 
anything away from researchers, nor does it change the existing default rules. 
Indeed, the default differential property interests are preserved. Our proposal 
simply addresses the new middle ground created by somatic cells that are 
reprogrammed to a pluripotent state, and conservatively errs on the side of 
individual donors to the extent that reprogrammed pluripotency and subsequent 
cell differentiation can give somatic cells the very potential to become life that 
the existing default rules acknowledge as a key reason for extending property 
interest to donors. Rather than destabilizing the existing regime, this proposal 
respectfully adheres to the preferences and concerns embedded in the existing 
default rules. 
CONCLUSION 
Discussions concerning property rights in the body have been ongoing for 
hundreds of years. Moore v. Regents of the University of California was a 
watershed moment in establishing the foundation for the current default rules 
concerning the type of property interests individuals have in excised somatic 
cells, with subsequent cases adding the bricks and mortar. This Article has 
shown the evolving nature of these property interests, especially in the context 
of new genetic technologies such as iPSCs. By giving somatic cells the 
potential to become life, iPSCs challenge the entire modern regime concerning 
property interests in excised human cells and tissues and create new 
opportunities for rethinking this area of law. Our proposal provides a coherent 
framework to deal with the implications iPSCs might have for property law 
without upending this entire jurisprudence. By granting the same property 
interest in gametes and embryos to somatic cells that are reprogrammed and 
differentiated into reproductive cells, the current legal framework, policy 
preferences, and expectations among scientists and research participants are 
preserved. In addition, this recognition of property interests creates an incentive 
for the iPSC research community to develop separate biobanks composed of 
samples from donors who fully consent to their cells and tissues being 
subjected to this new technology. This provides a viable means by which the 
integrity of both the iPSC research agenda and cell and tissue donors can be 
preserved. 
 
